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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether evidence of the non-use of a seat

belt by the plaintiff should have been allowed by the trial
court.
II.

Whether the jury's use of extraneous

evidence, a dictionary, to define the word "proximate11 was
reversible error.

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
1

Hillier v. Lamborn, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, (Ct. App.
08/05/87), 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
On August 5, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals entered
its Opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.
Subsequent to that time, the appellant, William J. Lamborn,
filed his Petition for Rehearing.

An Order Denying the

Petition for Rehearing was entered on the 2 6th day of August,
1987.

Subsequent to that time, an Order granting the appellant

an extension of time to and including October 9, 1987, was
entered on the 25th day of September, 1987. This Court has
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by
Writ of Certiorari pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(5) (effective
through December 31, 1987).

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-27-37 (1973) amended by Utah Code Ann, §§ 78-27-37, 38
(1986) may be controlling as to

whether this Court should

review the Opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new
trial:
Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for
negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence or gross negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in
the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering. As
used in this act, "contributory negligence"
includes "assumption of the risk."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
This was an action for personal injuries and property
damage suffered by the plaintiff-respondent,

Karen Hillier

(hereinafter "Hillier" or "plaintiff"), against
defendant-appellant, John Lamborn (hereinafter "Lamborn" or
"defendant").

The action arose as a result of an automobile

accident which occurred on a frontage road between Farmington
and Centerville, Davis County, Utah, in November of 1983. A
jury trial was held on the matter and a verdict was entered
against the defendant Lamborn which resulted in a total
judgment amount of $221,209.41.
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The defendant John Lamborn

then appealed from the Judgment.

Initially, the appeal was

filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, b u t subsequent
t > 1;,h€'" crea'

Utah C : i ri: t: of Appeals, the case was sent

to the Utah . c,.:. . Appeals for disposition

On A ug ust 5,,

1987 # the Utah Court ^f Appeals entered its Opinion affirming
the decision of the *

-

our". The plaintiff then petitioned

ic: :i i :i :j, u h :i :

11" i

P. i i :j u s t 2 6 , ] 9 8 7

An

extension of ti me unti 1 October 9 , 1 98 7, for the f i ling of
Lamborn's Petition for Certiorari w a s granted by th is Court,

Statement of Facts
facts
appea

held
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pertinent to the defendant's

follows:

s* - :s t : record; T. stands for
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the Second District Cour' r* Davis County, Judge
)

;

..:.'..

, rought suit

allegedly suffered when involved in an automobile accident with
a pickup truck driven by the defendant.
3

(R. 1-10.)

Thp p 1 d i rut. J 1 t suuqlit sptu j A 1 nil,unages lot II

medical and other out-of-pocket expenses she incurred and
general damages for her alleged pai n and suffering.
4

(R, 1-1 0.)

rhe major issue during the trial of thi s

matter centered upon the quest I on c £ 1 :i ab i 1 :i ti

'
" I'u f I i,a t: ei id

both parties introduced eye witness testimony, expert
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testimony, and physical evidence designed to support the
respective theories of the case.
5.

(T. 1-617.)

The defendant introduced a significant amount

of evidence that tended to show that the plaintiff negligently
contributed to the cause of the accident and consequently was
responsible for her injuries.
6.

(T. 348-520.)

Also, during the course of the trial, the

defendant argued that he should be allowed to introduce
testimony and other evidence to the effect that the plaintiff
was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident.

The

defendant sought to show through expert testimony that as a
result of the plaintiff's failure to use an available seat
belt, her injuries were far more severe than they would have
been otherwise.
7.

(R. 208.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the

plaintiff's attorney first broached the subject of the
plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt by asking her
on direct examination whether or not she was wearing a seat
belt, in direct contravention to a pretrial order by the judge
prohibiting any such evidence, the defendant's counsel was
prevented by the court from introducing the above-referenced
seat belt testimony.
8.

(R. 175.)

Also, the defendant's counsel was prohibited

from submitting to the jury instructions with regard to the use
of seat belts.
9.

(T. 595-96.)
After the jury had retired for a period of

time, one or all of the jurors requested that the bailiff

4

provide them with

lictionary

Evidently, the jury intended

tn utc; and ihil I.I

lirtini

r > t m 111*-1 pni posp \\\ ih'tinirni

the legal term "proximate" i n order to gain a better
understanding of the legal ter m "proximate cause," which had
all r eady beei 1 provided in

ury instructions submitted to it

prior to the time i t ret"
]0

.

The j

excess of $2C 0,000.00

(R, 3 99 4 01|.) • ,

entered its verdict in an amount i"
A Judgment was prepared and entered :-

New Trial, Or i n the Alternate we, For the Remission I of Damages
which w a s denied by the trial court
•' '''

11

' ' '•'•

(R. 387 )

?s i i appeal followed that denial.

]2

(R. 404.)

Oi ) Aug us t 5, 1 98 3 , tl le Utah Cour t of Appeals

affirmed the Judgment of the trial cour t.

Following that, the

defendant's Petition for Rehearing was deitied on August 26,
; '* -

(Appe .1 id :i x " ,?»

)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

EVIDENCE OF THE NON-USE OF A SE^T BELT BY THE
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.
Rule -* *

r the Rules of the Utah

Supreme Court state that review
in order whei l

panel

question of S* •

sf certiorari may be

"ie 'tyjrt
.

Appeals has decided a
it is in i uni Ii

a decision of the Supreme Court m

wlitMi the Court of Appeals

has decided -v important question ot State law which has not
b e e i I,

bi i t

s

I be , s e t::t:J e d I: }

i in
5

Mipi (Mine I n u n

I n t in i >•;

case, the issue of whether evidence that a party was not
wearing a seat belt should go to the jury was decided by the
Court of Appeals,

That decision by the Court of Appeals

should, because of its importance, be decided by this Court.
Further, it appears that the decision of the Court of Appeals
may be in conflict with the decision in Acculog, Inc. v.
Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) and with U.C.A. § 78-27-37
(1953 as amended).

Specifically, the concurring Opinion of

Justice Oakes sheds significant doubt on the finding of the
Court of Appeals.
A.

It Was an Error in Law to Prohibit the
Defendant From Introducing Seat Belt Testimony
and in Failing to Submit to the Jury the
Defendant's Proffered Seat Belt Instruction.

The defendant should have been allowed to introduce
seat belt testimony under the comparative negligence scheme of
the State of Utah.

The comparative negligence scheme upon

which Utah courts functioned for purposes of this appeal is
found within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37
(1973) amended by Utah Code Ann., §§ 78-27-37, 38 (1986),
which states as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for
negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence or gross negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed should be diminished
in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person
recovering. As used in this act,
"contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."

6

(Emphasis added.)

It should be noted that the terms of this

statute do not limit the apportionment of negligence to the
parties on the basis of the negligence of a party attributable
to a particular act or to a particular occurrence, but on the
basis of the negligence attributable to the damages caused by a
particular party.

In other words, the provisions of former

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 do not require that the negligence
by which the amount of an award will be reduced be the
negligence that caused the accident, but rather, the negligence
can also be the negligence that contributed to or caused the
damages suffered by a plaintiff.

Further, this is completely

consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465
Comment c, which provides that damages may be apportioned
between the defendant and the plaintiff
Where the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff is found not to contribute in any
way to the original accident, but to be a
substantial contributing factor in
increasing the harm which ensues.
The defendant cited the above-language to the trial
court in a Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion
in Limine to exclude all evidence relating to seat belts.
208, 210.)

(R.

Basically, with regard to the seat belt testimony,

it is the defendant's position that this is really an avoidable
consequences problem, a question of fact that should have been
submitted to the jury for determination.

The defendant

intended to show at trial that the plaintiff's failure to wear
an available seat belt caused the majority of her injuries.

7

Justice Oaks in the relatively recent case of
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), set out
guidelines for how district courts should handle the issue of
apportionment of damages in cases where the negligence of the
recovering plaintiff did not in fact contribute to the cause of
the accident but did contribute to the damages incurred.

It is

also interesting to note that Justice Oaks, as the defendant
did, cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465 Comment c
(1975) in support of his position.
In Acculog, the plaintiff's van, equipped with
special geological equipment, caught fire and was destroyed on
the same day that the defendant Peterson had installed a new
fuel filter to correct over-heating in the engine.

The

plaintiff claimed substantial damages as a result of
destruction of the van and the special equipment in the van, as
well as lost profits.

Evidently, the plaintiff did not carry a

fire extinguisher in its van.

A special verdict containing

five interrogatories was submitted to the jury.

Apparently, as

a result of the special verdict, the jury determined that the
plaintiffs were responsible for the damage to their vehicle
because they failed to carry a fire distinguisher,
notwithstanding the defendant's evident responsibility for the
cause of the fire.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to

the trial court and specifically held that the trial court had
committed prejudicial error in submitting to the jury the
question of the plaintiff's comparative negligence.

However,

the court also expressly did not address the issue of

8

mitigation of damages or what is sometimes called the doctrine
of avoidable consequences.

However, in the concurring opinion,

Justice Oaks, as noted above, set out a scheme for determining
how the district court should handle the issue of apportionment
of damages at the new trial.
Justice Oakes noted that first the negligence of both
the plaintiff and the defendant, which resulted in the actual
accident itself, were to be compared in a fashion consistent
with former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37.

The trier of fact was

to determine what damages the plaintiff would be allowed to
recover, diminished in an amount proportional to the amount of
negligence attributable to the plaintiff.

In other words, the

jury was to determine as to the cause of the accident the
respective percentages of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff and on the part of the defendant.
Next, Justice Oaks said the jury would need to
determine whether or not the plaintiff negligently failed to
avoid the damages incurred because of the accident.

If the

plaintiff negligently failed to avoid such damages, then the
plaintiff's award should be reduced by the amount of damages
that the plaintiff would not have suffered if the plaintiff had
not acted negligently in failing to avoid the consequences of
the original accident.

This result is reasonable and not

contrary to the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute, which in
fact would seem to mandate such an approach.

Further, the

concurrence of Justice Oaks is not in conflict with the

9

majority opinion which reserved the determination on the
avoidable consequences problem until another time.
Evidence of whether or not the defendant was wearing
her seat belt should have been admitted during the trial of
this matter.

Many courts now treat a failure to use seat belts

as an avoidable consequences problem, holding that failure to
wear an available seat belt, which results in the aggravation
of injuries, may result in a reduction of recoverable damages.
Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 SO.2d 447
(Fla. 1984); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475,
335 N.W. 2d 824 (1983); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323
N.E. 2d 164 (1974); Elchorn v. Olsen, 35 N.E. 2d 774 (1975);
Wilson v. Volkswagon of America, 445 F.Supp. 1368 (D. Va.
1978); Kassela v. Stovitsch, 373 N.Y. 2d 601 (1972); Pritts
v. Walter Lowry Trucking Co., 400 F.Supp. 867 (D. Pa. 1975);
Langford v. Chrysler Motors, 513 F.2d 1121 (1975); Henderson
v. United States, 429 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1970); Uresky v.
Fedora, 27 Con. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Hurnkey v.
Cornett Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 3d 170, 240 N.W. 2d 382 (1976);
Glover v. Daniels, 310 F.Supp. 760 (D. Miss. 1970); Thomas
v. Goodman, 372 A.2d 378 (1977); Benner v. Interstate
Container Corp., 73 F.R.D. 502 (D. Penn. 1977); Latta v.
Siefke, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 937 (1978); Noth v. Scheurer, 385
F.Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Con. Supp.
289, 259 A.2d 145 (Conn. Super. 1969); Fintenot v. Fidelity &
Gas Co., 217 So.2d 702 (La. App. 1969); Sonnier v. Ramsey,
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424 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) and Tom Brown Drilling
Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W. 2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
Other states which have comparative negligence
statutes have allowed the introduction of evidence that
indicated that seat belts were available to the injured
plaintiff and that there was a causal relationship between the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's failure
to use seat belts.

Those courts have also allowed jury

instructions with regard to avoidable consequences if seat
belts had been worn.

See Bentzler v. Brauh, 34 Wis. 2d 362

(1967); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444 (1974); Pritz v.
Walter Lawry Trucking Co., 400 F.Supp. 867 (W.D. Penn. 1975);
and Wilson v. Volkswagon of American, Inc.f 445 F.Supp. 1368
(E.D. Va. 1978).
B.

There is a Valid Doctrinal Basis for Allowing
the Seat Belt Defense in Utah.

Although it may be argued that the seat belt defense
does not fit neatly into existing tort doctrine, there is
no reasonable basis to exclude it at trial.

The Utah Court of

Appeals evidently completely ignored this aspect of defendant's
argument.

In fact, the Court of Appeals devoted only two small

paragraphs; one of which consisted of a string cite of cases,
some of which are inapposite and not applicable to the question
at hand.
Dean Prosser recognized that although evidence
relative to the seat belt defense does not necessarily fit

11

conveniently within traditional tort doctrines, it nevertheless
is more reasonable to admit it than to exclude it.

He said:

The more difficult problem is presented
when the plaintiff's prior conduct is found
to have played no part in bringing about an
impact or accident, but to have aggravated
the ensuing damages. In such cases, [some
courts] have apportioned the damages,
holding that the plaintiff's recovery will
be reduced to the extent that they have
been aggravated by his own antecedent
negligence. This would seem to be the
better view, unless we are to place an
entirely artificial emphasis upon the
moment of impact, and the pure mechanics of
causation.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 65 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis
added).

Also, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopts a

similar view, besides that as presented in § 465, Comment c.
In § 433A, apportionment of harm to causes, the Restatement
says:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned
among two or more causes where
(a)

There are distinct harms, or

(b) There is a reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be
apportioned among two or more causes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A (1965) (emphasis added).
Explanatory Comment c to the above-quoted section
goes on to say:
Such apportionment may also be made where
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
is found not to contribute in any way to
the original accident or injury, but to be
a substantial contributing factor in
increasing the harm which ensues. There
must of course be satisfactory evidence to
12

support such a finding, and the court may
properly refuse to permit the apportionment
on the basis of mere speculation*
In the case at hand, the defendant proffered expert
testimony as to the consequential damages of plaintiff's
failure to wear an available seat belt.

Clearly, the defendant

met the prerequisites of § 433A and § 465 of the Restatement,
as well as the policy requirements of Prosper.

The

Restatement and Prosser apportionment rule, as stated
above, are consistent with what the seat belt defense stands
for.

Non-use of an available seat belt does not entitle the

defendant, as a matter of law, to a reduction of the
plaintiff's damages, but the defendant istfiventhe
opportunity to demonstrate to the jury's satisfaction that the
plaintiff's conduct contributed to the actual damage she
suffered.

Further, the avoidable consequences doctrine or

apportionment rules have been applied in non-seat belt
situations.

See e.g., Dean v. Holland, 350 N.Y.S. 2d

859 (1973); and Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 tf.W. 2d 118
(N.D. 1983).
Also, certain judicial opinions which cite a lack of
duty on the part of the plaintiff to wear an available seat
belt, because of the fact that common practice indicates that
most drivers and passengers do not wear an available seat belt,
lack a defensible foundation in logic or in law.

Certainly, it

is true that absent a mandatory seat belt use law there is no
violation of a statutory duty, and consequently, no negligence
per se, but that does not vitiate the "reasonable person"

13

standard of common law negligence.

It cannot responsibly be

argued that in 1983, the vast majority of motor vehicle
occupants did not know the incontrovertible safety value of
motor vehicle seat belts.
Parenthetically, the seat belt law currently in force
in the State of Utah is probably inapplicable to the case at
hand for two reasons:

First, it was enacted subsequent to the

accident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and
second, it was not passed by a two-thirds majority of both
houses of the Legislature.

The seat belt law as currently set

out provides that evidence of the failure to use a seat belt
may not be utilized in a civil action.

The Utah Constitution

clearly provides that an amendment to the rules of evidence may
only be made by a two-thirds vote of each House.

The right

to issue a new rule of evidence is reserved to the Supreme
Court.

(Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4.)

The seat belt act was

not passed by a two-thirds majority in either House.
Persons who fail to expend the minimal effort
required to engage a seat belt are not acting reasonably and
should not be rewarded for their non-feasance.

The

Wisconsin Supreme Court said as early as 19 67 that:
[w]hile we agree with those courts that
have concluded that it is not negligence
per se to fail to use seat belts where the
only statutory standard is one that
requires the installation of the seat belts
in the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude
that there is a duty, based on the common
law standard of ordinary care, to use
available seat belts independent of any
statutory mandate.

14

On the basis of [certain accident
statistics], it is a matter of common
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile
either knows or should know of the
additional safety factor produced by the
use of seat belts,
Bentzler v, Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639, 640 (Wis. 1967).
Also, the common practice of failing to engage an
available seat belt is not dispositive on what constitutes
reasonable behavior by automobile users.

The fact that the

majority of people fail to use seat belts does not make that
action reasonable.

This is especially true when the majority's

behavior involves unnecessary risks. Again, Prosser terms
such behavior "customary negligence."
Torts, § 33 (4th ed. 1971).

W. Prosser, Law of

The common law standard of

reasonableness is not an actual standard, but one to which
people ought to aspire.

Judge Learned Hand made this clear

when he said:
Indeed, in most cases, reasonable prudence
is in fact common prudence; but strictly it
is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set
its own tests, however, persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission.
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
C.

Seat Belt Testimony Should Hgtve Been Admitted
as Curative Evidence.

Prior to the trial of the action, the judge of the
trial court instructed both parties to introduce no evidence
with regard to seat belts until such time as both parties
15

had the opportunity to brief the issue, present the briefs to
the court and argue the respective positions outside the
presence of the jury.

However, prior to the time set aside for

the argument of the seat belt issue, the attorney for the
plaintiff broached the issue.
Utah follows a rule of evidence permitting "curative
evidence" to be forwarded by a party when the opposition
presents irrelevant or inadmissible evidence.

In Leger v.

Roberts, 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the admission of otherwise irrelevant evidence,
determining:
We see no error in the trial court having
admitted the evidence, particularly since
one of Leger's witnesses, who appeared to
be an expert, opened the matter up and thus
made it a legitimate target for
cross-examination.
Id. at 215.

See also, Millford State Bank v.

Westfield Canal & Irrigation Co., 162 P.2d 101 (Utah 1945).
The Utah Court of Appeals did not even address this
issue in its Opinion.

The defendant vigorously urges the Court

to consider this and all other issues relevant to the seat belt
argument.
POINT II
THE JURY'S USE OF EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE,
A DICTIONARY,
TO DEFINE THE WORD "PROXIMATE,11 ENTITLED THE
DEFENDANT TO A NEW TRIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the jury
evidently requested the bailiff provide them with a
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dictionary.

The bailiff did procure and provide the jury with

a dictionary for the jury's use.

Subsequently, it was learned

that the jury used the dictionary to define the term
"proximate" in order to understand the legal term "proximate
cause."

This fact was supported by a juro^r affidavit.

This

consideration of extraneous material was clearly an
irregularity which required the Court of Appeals to reverse the
Judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
The case at hand is a perfect example of the dangers
that can be encountered when the jury breaks off on its own to
interpret the meaning of legal terms.

In this case, the jury

used the dictionary to define the term "proximate," a term
already defined in the Court's instruction^ to the jury.
Central to any negligence case is the issue of proximate
cause.

It is a term of art, a term used to express the concept

of "legal cause."

It is a term used to focus a jury's

attention on the consideration of whether the defendant's
conduct is "close" enough in the causal chain of events leading
to the plaintiff's injuries to warrant the imposition of a
legal duty upon the defendant.

Any dictionary definition

focusing on closeness in time or location is woefully
inadequate and inherently misleading.

The misleading effect of

the dictionary definition is magnified in this case because of
the relationship of the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct
in terms of closeness in time and distance.

The dictionary

definition of "proximate" could lead a reasonable juror to
focus unduly on the closeness of time and distance in analyzing
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proximate cause and therefore contaminate the deliberative
process.

This is so notwithstanding any particular juror's

affidavit to the contrary, particularly in light of Rule 606(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which precludes affidavit
testimony on the question of whether the extraneous material
was actually prejudicial.
The actual effect on the jury of looking up the word
"proximate" in a dictionary is not discoverable.

But, in light

of the facts of the case and the law, this Court should
conclude it is reasonable that the jury's verdict would be, and
in fact was, affected by a layman's definition of a term so
weighted with peculiarly legal baggage.

Therefore, this Court

should grant the defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to adequately
address the seat belt issue and the extraneous evidence
issue.

The seat belt issue in particular is an extremely

important issue that should be decided by this Court as opposed
to the Court of Appeals.

The issue should be fully and

properly briefed to this Court before any decision is made
about whether or not seat belt testimony should be admitted and
utilized by the trier of fact.

The Court of Appeals' decision

may in fact be contrary to the decision of this Court in
Acculog, and is contrary to former Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-28-37.

Further, as stated above, the question is such an

important question of state law that it should be settled by

18

this Court and none other.

Therefore, the

defendant-appellant, William J. Lamborn, by and through his
counsel, respectfully requests this Court to grant his Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ ^

day of October,

1987.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
f
the foregoing instrument was mailed; ifirGt class, postage ju*~*t oefi)ja*\
•propaid on this
/ ^ day of (-jOWr*Y^~
1987, to the
following counsel or record:
Stephen G. Morgan
Mark L. Anderson
261 East 240 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HILLIER2/MMW
jbpml0107
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Karen Hillier,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
William J. Lamborn,

Case No. 860030-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench and Orme.

GREENWOOD,

Judge:

FILED
AUG 5 1987
Timothy M Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant to
recover for personal injury and property damage she suffered as
a result of an automobile accident with defendant. The jury
found defendant 80% negligent, plaintiff 20% negligent and
awarded plaintiff $221,209.41 in damages. Defendant appeals
seeking a new trial or a reduction in the damages.
At about 8:30 a.m. on November 13, 1982, plaintiff was
driving southbound on 1-15 near Farmington, Utah when
defendant, who was driving south slowly on the right shoulder
of the road, pulled out in front of her causing her to swerve
sharply and her car to roll over. Plaintiff was thrown from
the vehicle and suffered extensive injuries.
The jury was instructed, over defendant's objection, on
the sudden emergency doctrine which states in part that a
person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly
confronted with peril is not required to use the same judgment
required in calmer moments. The court, however, refused to
submit defendant's seat belt instruction to the jury and ruled
that defendant would not be allowed to present any evidence
regarding seat belts; ' Dirring jury deliberations one juror
requested and received a dictionary from the bailiff for the
purpose of defining "proximate" in order to understand
-proximate cause." After the jury returned its verdict a
judgment was entered. This appeal followed the court's denial
of defendant's motion for a new trial or, alternatively,
reduction of damages.

On appeal defendant claims the trial court erred in: 1)
submitting the sudden emergency instruction to the jury; 2)
disallowing the seat belt instruction and evidence; 3) failing
to grant a new trial due to the juror's use of a dictionary to
define "proximate"; and 4) denying the motion for a new trial
on the basis that the jury verdict was unreasonable and based
on passion, prejudice and insufficient evidence.
I
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine.
Defendant argues the sudden emergency instruction was
inappropriate because it requires plaintiff to be free of
negligence. The instruction stated:
A person, who without negligence on his
part, is suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted with peril arising from either
the actual presence or the appearance of
imminent danger to himself or to others is
not expected nor required to use the same
judgment and prudence that may be required
of him in calmer and more deliberate
moments.
In such a situation, his duty is to
exercise only the degree of care which an
ordinary prudent person would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances.
If, at that moment, he exercises such
care, he does all the law requires of him,
even though in the light of after-events,
it might appear that a difference choice
and manner of action would have been
better and safer.
Defendant points out that plaintiff was not negligence free
because the jury found her 20% negligent. Defendant also claims
that plaintiff was necessarily negligent because she failed to
move into the left lane when she first saw defendant's truck on
the side of the road and a non-negligent person would have changed
lanes.
Plaintiff's theory of the case, on the other hand, was that
she was not negligent for failing to anticipate defendant's act of
pulling out in front of her. She claimed that defendant should
have used his signal and looked behind him before pulling out into
the right hand lane. Plaintiff asserts that the sudden emergency
instruction was proper because it was consistent with her theory
of the case. We agree.
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The general rule is that a party is entitled to have his
theory of the case submitted to the jury* Watters v. Ouerry,
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981). The trial court has a duty to
••cover the theories and points of law of both parties in its
instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support
them.- Black v. McKnioht. 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has examined the appropriateness
of submitting a sudden emergency instruction to the jury in
several cases. In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 104
Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), Christiansen v. Utah Transit
Auth., 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) and Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d
170 (Utah 1983), the Court found no error in the trial court's
submission of a sudden emergency instruction.
In Redd, the Court found the instruction proper where the
jury was not compelled by the evidence to conclude that
defendant was driving without due care. Redd, 137 P.2d at
378. Similarly, in Christiansen, the Court upheld a sudden
emergency instruction despite the fact that the jury found both
parties partially negligent. The Court reasoned that the
instruction was proper because it was supported by some
evidence and by one of the parties* theories. Christensen, 649
P.2d at 47. Finally, in Anderson, the Court found no error
where the sudden emergency instruction presented defendant's
theory of the case that he had not acted negligently.
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 174.
In this case, plaintiff testified that she saw
defendant's truck some distance south of her, entirely on the
shoulder of the road, moving south slowly. She could not
determine what defendant was doing but assumed he intended to
slow the truck to a stop and park it. (In fact, defendant was
"road hunting" for pheasants.) When she was four or five car
lengths from him, he steered his truck into plaintiff's lane
directly in front of her. It is undisputed that defendant did
not signal before driving onto the road from the shoulder.
Plaintiff's theory of the case was that she was not at fault
for failing to anticipate defendant's negligence in pulling out
in front of her. The trial court's submission of the sudden
emergency instruction to the jury was in accordance with
plaintiff's theory of the case and was supported by evidence
presented at trial. The jury's ultimate determination that
plaintiff was 20% negligent does not nullify the propriety of
the instruction. Likewise, we reject defendant's contention
that plaintiff was obviously negligent for failing to move into
the left lane prior to passing defendant. Plaintiff was
driving on a two-lane road and should not necessarily be
- expected to cross the center line to avoid a car driving slowly
on the shoulder. The question of plaintiff's negligence was a
question of fact for the jury and the trial court could not
conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff was negligent.
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Defendant cites two Utah cases which he contends are
indistinguishable from this case and dictate reversal of the
trial courtfs denial of the motion for a new trial. In Solt v.
qpflfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (Utah 1971) and Keller v,
Shellev. 551 P.2d 513 (Utah 1976), the Court found as a matter
of law that the sudden emergency or peril did not arise without
fault by the defendants. In Solt. defendant, while driving his
automobile, hit a two-year, eight month old child who followed
a ball into the street. Defendant testified he was driving 30
to 35 miles per hour when he observed the child come upon the
roadway 60 to 80 feet in front of him. Defendant applied his
brakes but was unable to avoid striking the child. Defendant
did not contend that there was any sudden darting and the Court
found the sudden emergency instruction improper due to the
absence of evidence of a sudden or unexpected situation arising
without the fault of defendant. The Court said the defendant
saw what he should have seen all the time and was therefore
negligent. The Court, in reversing, noted that "[u]nder the
evidence given in this case it is difficult to see how the jury
could have found for the defendant unless they were misled by
some instructions given by the Court.M Solt, 479 P.2d at 476.
The case before this Court differs from Solt in two
important respects. First, in this case, plaintiff contends
defendant's act of pulling out in front of her caused a sudden
and unexpected situation, whereas in Solt, no such claim was
made. Second, there is substantial difference between a child
chasing a ball into the street and an adult in an automobile
pulling out in front of another vehicle without signaling. A
young child is reasonably likely to run into a street in front
of a car. Conversely, an adult would reasonably be expected to
first look behind him and signal before pulling into the road
from the shoulder.
Similarly, Keller involves a situation where no evidence
was submitted to demonstrate a sudden and unexpected situation
arising without fault on the part of the plaintiff. Keller,
551 P.2d at 514. In Keller, defendant, while passing another
vehicle, drove into the rear of plaintiffs vehicle. The Court
recognized that a driver intending to pass another vehicle must
be certain that he can safely pass the other vehicle. When
defendant attempted to pass, plaintiff was stopped waiting for
traffic to clear so she could make a left turn. The Court
found the sudden emergency instruction improper because
defendant was clearly negligent. Unlike Keller, in this case
plaintiff was not undisputably negligent. Therefore, in light
of plaintiff's evidence submitted at trial and her theory of
the case, the instruction was proper.
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II
Defendant's next claim is that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow evidence concerning plaintiff's failure to wear
a seat belt and by failing to submit an instruction to the jury
that nonuse of a seat belt may mitigate damages.
A majority of other jurisdictions have held that evidence of
nonuse of a seat belt on the issue of mitigation of damages is
inadmissible. Britton v. Doehrina. 286 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666,
671 (1970); Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161, 164
(1974); Fischer v. Moore. 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458, 459
(1973); Lipscomb v. Diamani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 1967);
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 726 (D.C. 1976); Hampton v. State
Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236, 248-49 (1972);
Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford. Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 354
N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984); Miller v. Havnes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 300
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Selaado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M.
579, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975); Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d 48,
62 (Okla. 1976). We agree with the rationale of those cases and
hold similarly that seat belt evidence is inadmissible in this
case which arose prior to enactment of the present Utah statute.1
Ill
The third issue raised
erred in failing to grant a
a dictionary. According to
jury, during deliberations,
define MproximateM in order
The bailiff complied.

on appeal is whether the trial court
new trial due to the juror's2 use of
affidavits submitted to the court, the
asked the bailiff for a dictionary to
to understand "proximate cause."3

Clearly the jury's request for a dictionary and consideration
of HproximateH was improper and irregular. State v. Donald, 90
Utah 533, 537, 63 P.2d 246, 248 (1936). The jury was instructed
that Hit is your duty to follow the law as the court states it to
you.M The proper procedure would have been for the jury to report
the difficulty to the court and for the court to instruct the jury
on the definition of "proximate". Id.
1. At the time this case was tried, the legislature had not
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1987) which provides that
"failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute contributory or
comparative negligence, and^may hot be introduced as evidence in
any civil litigtion on the issue of injuries or on the issue of
mitigation of damages."
2. How many jurors used the dictionary is unclear.
simplicity we will refer to one juror.

For

3. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted affidavits from
different jurors regarding the use of the dictionary.
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Despite the obvious improper conduct of the jury, such conduct
must prejudice the substantial rights of defendant to warrant
reversal. Id,: Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
In State v. Donald, the Utah Supreme Court held# in a
forgery case, that a jury*s use of a dictionary to define
"utter" did not prejudice the substantial rights of defendant
and did not warrant reversal. The Court explained that even if
the judge had instructed the jury on the definition of "utter"
it would have been the same in substance as the dictionary
definition read by the jury.
In this case, the record does not contain the actual
definition of ••proximate" the jury read nor identify the
dictionary used. Without that definition we cannot compare the
legal definition of "proximate cause" with the definition of
"proximate" examined by the jury. In the absence of that
crucial information, we do not find any basis for finding that
substantial rights of defendant were prejudiced by the juror's
reference to the dictionary.
Plaintiff, who nonetheless saw fit to provide a
counteraffidavit designed to diffuse the gravity of the juror's
use of the dictionary, claims the trial court erred in
considering the affidavit due to the restrictions imposed by
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2). Rule 59(a)(2) states:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted . . . for any of
the following causes . . . (2) Misconduct
of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent
to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them
by the court, by resort to a determination
by chance or as a result of bribery, such
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
In several Utah cases, the Utah Supreme Court has
interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) and held that the rule authorizes a
jury verdict to be impeached by the affidavit of a juror only
when the verdict was determined by chance or bribery. Rosenlof
v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983); Groen v.
TRI-O-INC., 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983); Smith v. Barnett, 17
Utah 2d 240, 408 P.2d 709, 710 (1965). The policy behind the
narrow interpretation of the law was set forth in Wheat v.
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952):
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To permit litigants to get jurors to sign
affidavits or testify to matters discussed
in connection with their functions as
jurors would open the door to inquiry into
all manner of things which a losing
litigant might consider improper:
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers
of settlement, personal experiences,
prejudice against litigants or their
causes or the classes to which they
belong. It would be an interminable and
totally impracticable process. Such post
mortems would be productive of no end of
mischief and render service as a juror
unbearable. If jurors were so
circumscribed in their deliberations, it
is likely that judge and counsel would
have to be present in the jury room
attempting to monitor and regulate their
thought and discussions into approved
channels.
Id. at 937.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted
59(a)(2) and limited the circumstances under which jury affidavits
may be admitted into evidence, the Court also adopted the Utah
Rules of Evidence on April 13, 1983 and made them effective as of
September 1, 1983. Under Utah R. Evid. 606(b) "a juror may testify
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.M The
Court's adoption of Rule 606(b) indicates an intent to allow juror
affidavits into evidence under the circumstances described in
606(b). In effect, Rule 606(b) provides another exception to the
general rule that juror affidavits are inadmissible.
Applying 606(b) to the facts of this case, the dictionary was
"extraneous information." Clearly, the judge did not give the
dictionary to the jury. Whether it was "prejudicial" was dependent
upon the definition examined by the jury. Because a question
existed as to whether or. not use of the dictionary was
"prejudicial," both affidavits were admissible under 606(b).
IV
Finally, defendant argues that the jury verdict was
unreasonable and was based on passion, prejudice and insufficient
evidence. Juries are given wide discretion in assessing damages.
Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1287 (1973).
When a jury determines a question of fact, its verdict will not be
disturbed if it is supported by any competent evidence. Time
Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, 657 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah
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1982); Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah
1975). Further, this Court will defer to the jury's verdict unless
it is "so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to
clearly indicate passion, prejudice or corruption." McAfee v.
Oaden Union Rv. & Depot Co., 62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104
(1923).
The record indicates that the jury's verdict is supported by
competent evidence. Further, the damages awarded are not
shockingly excessive in light of the extensive injuries suffered by
plaintiff.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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Karen Hillier,
Plaintiff and Respondent/
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FQR REHEARING ^ '

v.
William J. Lamborn,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 860C30-CA

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant/
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter,
and the Court having duly considered said petition,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing be denied.
Dated this 25th day of August, 1987.
FOR THE COURT:

riinothy M. Shea
Snea
Tirfiothy
C l e r k of t h e Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the
same in the United States mail/ postage prepaid to the following:
Gary B. Ferguson# Esq.
Michael K. Mohrman# Esq.
Richards, Brandt/ Miller & Nelson
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main/ P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City# UT 84110
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South/ 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 27th day of August/ 1987<

nt(lA
Karen Bean
Case"Management Clerk

MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

KAREN HILLIER,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

APPELLANT'S EX PARTE
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 860030-CA

Appellant, William J. Lamborn, by and through his
counsel of record, Michael K. Mohrman, hereby moves this Court
pursuant to Rule 45(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, to
extend appellants time for filing a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari from September 25, 1987 up to and including October
9, 1987.
As good cause for this Motion, appellant alleges as
follows:
1. The Order denying appellant's Petition for Rehearing
was entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 26, 1987.
Therefore, time for filing appellant's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari has not yet expired.

2. Counsel for appellant, Michael K. Mohrman, was
preparing for and participated in a two-week trial beginning
September 8, 1987. This trial, before Third District Judge Scott
Daniels, is entitled Pickhover v. Smith's Management Inc.,
et al., Civil No. C85-4307.
3. Due to this trial, with its necessary preparation,
appellant's counsel was unable to file his Petition for Writ of
Certiorari with this Court.
4. Appellant seeks fourteen (14) day extension, and no
prior Request for Extension Time has been filed.
DATED this <sAj?

day of September, 1987.
RICHARD^, BRANDT, MILLER
^& NELSON

Wd/\/
MI CffAELJC^MQHPMAN

—Att^irney^for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF

D-DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was hand-delivered on this ^ ^ 7
September, 1987 to the following counsel of record:
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HILLIER1/TAMI
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day of

MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

KAREN HILLIER,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

]
|
]|
|
]

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I
]

Case No. 860030-CA

WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,
Defendant/Appellant.

This matter having come before the Court upon
defendant's/appellant's Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-captioned
matter, and the Court having duly considered said Motion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's/appellantfs
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari be granted and that the time for filing said
Petition be extended up to and including October 9, 1987.
DATED this

day of September, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Supreme Court Justice

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was hand-delivered on this o^2> day of
September, 1987 to the following counsel of record:
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

iuMd/C/
HILLIER2/TAMI
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ACCULOG, INC., a Colorado corporation,
Robert Pflster and Kenton Shaw, copartners d/b/a Acculog Field Services,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Keith PETERSON, d/b/a Peterson
Ford, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 18133.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.
In a suit for destruction of plaintiffs
van and logging equipment by fire, allegedly caused by defendants negligence, plaintiff appealed from judgment of the Seventh
District Court, Grand County, George E.
Ballif, J. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that: (1) where it was found that van
had been negligently serviced and that
such negligence was proximate cause of
fire and damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to carry fire extinguisher in van was
not contributing factor in causing injury,
and trial court erred in submitting to jury
the question of plaintiffs' comparative negligence, and (2) plaintiffs loss of profits
calculated at $33,122.40 was meticulously
supported by exhibits documenting gross
profits, deducting expenses not incurred
when contracts were lost, and deriving net
loss of profits from difference between the
two, and there was sufficient evidentiary
basis for jury to have determined the issue.
Judgment on special verdict vacated,
and case remanded for new trial.
Oaks, J., filed concurring opinion.
1. Negligence G»97
Ultimate facts in comparative negligence case embrace only negligence, causation and percentages of negligence attributed to plaintiff and defendant, and a plaintiff cannot be held to be contributorily negligent unless his negligence is causally connected to the plaintiffs injury. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-37.

2. Negligence ®=>97
Only where plaintiffs negligent conduct was contributing factor in causing injury does comparative negligence become
defense for defendant. U.C.A.1953, 78-2737.
3. Automobiles <S»368
Where it was found that van had been
negligently serviced and that such negligence was proximate cause of fire and
damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to
carry fire extinguisher in van was not contributing factor in causing injury, and trial
court erred in submitting to jury the question of plaintiffs' comparative negligence.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
4. Damages <§=>5, 184
Generally, all damages, special or general, causally connected to party's tortious
actions are recoverable, and although evidence must not be so indefinite as to allow
jury to speculate as to their amount, some
degree of uncertainty is tolerable.
5. Damages <3=>190
In suit for negligence causing plaintiffs' van and logging unit to be destroyed
by fire, plaintiffs loss of profits calculated
at $33,122.40 was meticulously supported
by exhibits documenting gross profits, deducting expenses not incurred when contracts were lost, and deriving net loss of
profits from difference between the two,
and there was sufficient evidentiary basis
for jury to have determined the issue.
Paul W. Mortensen, Harry E. Snow,
Moab, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Nelson E. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiffs Acculog appeal from a judgment of "no cause of action" which was
entered after a jury returned a special verdict. Acculog's 1977 four-wheel-drive Ford
E250 Quadravan, estimated at a value of
$7,000, caught fire and was destroyed later
in the same day that defendant Peterson
Ford had installed a new fuel filter to cor-
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rect overheating in the engine Also destro\ ed in the fire was Acculog s geological
equipment consisting of a Mount Sopns
bore-hole logging unit mounted on the vehicle and stipulated to have a value of $41,687 95 Acculog claimed that the destruction of the van and equipment resulted in a
loss of profits estimated by it at over $33,000 On the day of the fire Acculog did not
carrv a fire extinguisher in its van
At trial, Peterson Ford moved for a directed verdict in its favor at the end of
Acculog's case on the issue of lost profits
The motion was based on the ground that
plaintiffs had failed to prove the loss of
any profits under binding contracts The
motion was granted on that ground and on
the further ground added b\ the court that
there was no evidence before the jury what
the amount of the profits would have been
At the end of the trial Acculog excepted
to a special verdict form on the ground that
there was no evidence to support submitting the question of comparative and contributory negligence to the jur\, Acculog
also asked the trial court to instruct Peterson Ford not to argue to the jury that the
absence of a fire extinguisher constituted
negligence on its part as an\ such negligence was not relevant to causation of the
fire The court noted that it had difficulty
with that issue as it seemed to be a question of mitigation of damages However,
the amount of damages had been stipulated
to by the parties and the court determined
that it could not therefore instruct on mitigation Plaintiffs' request was denied by
the court with a comment that the jury
"would be looking at [the absence of a fire
extinguisher] from the standpoint of it being maybe just another one of the elements
that ended up m causing the fire " That
argument was made by the defense to the
jury
The special verdict contained five interrogatories
1 Was the defendant negligent m the
manner of servicing plaintiffs' van on
June 28, 1979?

2 If your answer to Question No 1 is
"yes," then answer the following question Was such negligence a proximate
cause of the fire and damage sustained
by plaintiffs on said date 7
3 Was [sic] the plaintiffs negligent at
the time of the fire m question on June
28, 1979?
If your answer to Question No 3 is
"yes," then answer the following question
4 Was such negligence a proximate
cause of the fire and damage sustained
by plaintiffs on said date?
5 If vou have answered all the previous questions "yes," then and only then,
are you to answer this question
Taking the combined negligence that
caused the damage as one hundred percent (100%), what percentage of that negligence was atnbutable [sic] to the plaintiffs and what percentage was attributable to the defendant7
(a) Percentage attributable to defendant 7
(b) Percentage attributable to plaintiffs7
TOTAL 100%
During deliberation the jury delivered a
note to the trial court that they could not
answer questions 2 and 4 as "they appear
to be two-part questions that we cannot
answer with a singular answer " The trial
court responded "you must answer either
yes or no to each of the questions referred
to above Consult the instructions I cannot help you further" Questions Nos 1
through 4 were answered m the affirmative Question No 5 attributed 14 percent
negligence to the defendant and 86 percent
negligence to the plaintiffs 1
Acculog's points on appeal can be reduced to two major issues (1) Was it error
for the trial court to refuse to direct a
verdict in favor of Acculog on the issue of
plaintiffs' comparative negligence7 (2)
Was it error for the trial court to direct a
verdict in favor of Peterson Ford on the
issue of loss of profits7

1. "These percentages seem to closelv parallel the
estimated value of the truck of $7,000 and the

stipulated damages to the equipment of $41,
687 95
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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Utah's comparative negligence statute,
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37, provides that the
contributory negligence of a person shall
not bar the recovery of damages "for negligence . . . resulting in death or injury to
person or property, if such negligence was
not as great as the negligence . . . of the
person against whom recovery is sought
" The question posed therefore is
whether plaintiffs' alleged negligence, their
failure to carry a fire extinguisher in the
van, caused "injury" to their own property,
and whether a jury instruction on plaintiffs' negligence was proper under the .circumstances of this case.

to take the combined negligence that
caused the damage and apportion it between the two parties. (Interrogatory 5.)
Testimony at the trial made it clear that
Acculog could have prevented the spread
of the fire from the engine <j)f the van to
the logging equipment had a fire extinguisher been available, but that should not
have been the question presented to the
jury. We are not concerned in comparative
negligence law with the cause of the damage, but with the cause of the injury instead.
The term "injury" is sometimes used in
the sense of i'damage," as including the
harm or loss for which compensation is
sought,
and has been defined as damage
[1,2] The ultimate facts in a compararesulting
from an unlawful act; but in
tive negligence case embrace only neglistrict
legal
significance, there is, propergence, causation and the percentages of
ly
speaking,
a material distinction benegligence attributed to plaintiff and detween the two terms, in that injury
fendant. Marcus v. Cortese, 98 N.M. 414,
means something done against the right
649 P.2d 482 (App.1982). A plaintiff canof the party, producing damage, whereas
not be held to be contributorily negligent
damage is the harm, detriment, or loss
unless his negligence is causally connected
sustained by reason of the injury.
to the plaintiff's injury. Boeke v. InternaClark
v. Cassetty, 71 N.M. 89, 376 P.2d 37
tional Paint Co. (Cal.)> Inc., 27 Wash.App.
(1962).
611, 620 P.2d 103 (1980); Kennedy v. City
of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788
The special verdict form in the case un(1980). From its inception comparative der review combined in interrogatories 2
negligence law has been so construed that and 4 injury and damage as one element of
once the combined negligence of plaintiff the tort. The jury was confused and reand defendant in causing the injury to the quested clarification. The confusion was
plaintiff is established, it is within the prov- compounded when in interrogatory 5 an
ince of the trier of fact to apportion fault apportionment was requested on cause of
or causation. Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. damage. In Kelley v. Capital Motors, 204
345, 244 N.W. 630 (1932). In other words, S.C. 304, 28 S.E.2d 836 (1944), a case inwhere plaintiff's negligent conduct was a versely apposite here, plaintiff sued decontributing factor in causing the injury, fendant for loss of his car in a fire originatcomparative negligence becomes a defense ing outside defendant's premises. Defendfor the defendant.
ant moved for a directed verdict on the
[3] Here there was no evidence present- ground that his failure to have a sprinkler
ed at trial that Acculog in any way caused system and fire extinguishers on the premthe fire. The jury found that Peterson ises bore no causal connection to the deFord had negligently serviced the van and struction of plaintiff's car. The trial court
that its negligence was a proximate cause denied the motion and defendant appealed.
of the fire and damage sustained by Accu- Finding no causal connection between delog. (Interrogatories 1 and 2.) The jury fendant's negligence and plaintiffs loss.
also found Acculog to have been negligent the appeals court stated:
On the issue of proximate cause, we are
in causing the fire and damage. (Interof the opinion that the only reasonable
rogatories 3 and 4.) When faced with apinference warranted by the record is that
portioning negligence, the jury was asked

ACCULOG, INC. v. PETERSON

Utah 731

Cite as 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984)

the proximate, direct and immediate
cause of the loss of [plaintiff's] automobile was a fire which broke out and commenced on premises over which [defendant] had no control, and which . . . spread
to [defendant's] sales room and repair
garage.
Likewise in the case under review, the
proximate, direct and immediate cause of
the loss of Acculog's van and equipment
was a fire which broke out in the engine
through no fault of Acculog's and spread
to the logging unit. Peterson Ford did not
have the defense of plaintiffs' comparative
negligence. The trial court expressed the
opinion that there might be a question of
mitigation of damages, but that issue is not
before us and we decline to address it.
We hold that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in submitting to the jury
the question of plaintiffs' comparative negligence.
LOSS OF PROFITS
On motion of the defendant, the trial
court directed a verdict against plaintiffs
on the issue of lost profits because they did
not produce evidence that they had entered
into any binding contracts which they were
unable to perform when they lost their van
and equipment. The court also based its
ruling on the ground that on the evidence
then before the court, the jury could not
have concluded what the profit on any job
would have been. Defendant's motion for
a directed verdict was supported by its
argument that lost profits could not be
based upon an understanding between Acculog and Amoco (one of its customers)
that did not rise to the level of a legally
binding contract. Defendant misperceives
the test. Acculog was not seeking lost
profits resulting from the breach of contract by a contracting party. Damages
were claimed in an action sounding in tort
against a noncontracting party.
[4] The general rule that all damages,
whether special or general, which are causally connected to a party's tortious actions
are recoverable was restated in ERA Helicopters, Inc. v. Digicon Alaska, Inc., Alas-

ka, 518 P.2d 1057 (1974). In that case a
survey company suffered losses when a
helicopter company damaged a gravity meter which it used to conduct gravity and
seismic surveys in the Norton Sound region
of Alaska, not dissimilar to the type of
work engaged in by Acculog in the instant
case. The survey company based its claim
for damages to property and for business
disruption on the helicopter company's negligence. Survey work was halted for 25
days until a new gravity meter could be
obtained. The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
If you find that the loss of the gravity
meter was proximately caused by the
negligence of the [helicopter company]
you may award as damages to the plaintiff such amount as will compensate for
the business interruption, including but
not limited to the standby time of the
crew aboard the vessel and the costs
related to the delay in completion of the
seismographic work for the client of
plaintiff.
Two complementary instructions dealt with
a party's duty to avoid loss and minimize
damages, and with damages proximately
resulting from the wrongful act. The reviewing court upheld those instructions and
damages awarded thereunder as proper.
Again, the measure of damages for loss of
use of property was set out in State v.
Stanley, Alaska, 506 P.2d 1284 (1973).
Stanley had lost his crab fishing boat as a
result of the state's negligence. Damages
were awarded for loss of use for 18
months, the period required to replace the
vessel. After recognizing the general objective of tort law to place an injured person in a position as nearly as possible to
the position he would have occupied but for
the defendant's tort, the court applied that
objective to the loss of a vessel: "[T]he
damages would be the vessel's share of
gross earnings reasonably anticipated for
the period involved, . . . less the expenditures which would have been chargeable to
the owner." Id. at 1293.
We have recognized that lost profits may
be recovered when the evidence submitted
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provides a basis for estimating them with
reasonable certainty. While the evidence
must not be so indefinite as to allow the
jury to speculate as to their amount, some
degree of uncertainty is tolerable. Cook
Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664
P.2d 1161 (1983); Penelko, Inc. v. John
Price Assocs., Inc., Utah, 642 P.2d 1229
(1982); Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 1303 (1979); dictum in Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d
183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973); Security Development Company v. Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah
2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969). Cf. Jenkins v.
Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 (1953).
[5] Under the above authorities, the trial court erred in directing a verdict against
Acculog on the issue of lost profits. Acculog produced as a witness Amoco's geologist who was in charge of all bidding and
who had accepted Acculog's bid on two
jobs. He testified that during his employment with Amoco, no bid accepted by him
had ever been rejected by the officer authorized to contractually bind Amoco. Acculog had to withdraw those bids when it
could not timely replace its logging unit.
Plaintiffs calculated their loss of profits at
$33,122.40. That amount was meticulously
supported by exhibits documenting gross
profits, deducting expenses not incurred
when the contracts were lost, and deriving
the net loss of profits from the difference
between the two. Thus there was laid an
evidentiary basis for the jury to have determined the issue. In this instance, we eximine the evidence in the light most favorible to the losing party, and when there is
i reasonable basis in the evidence and in
he inferences to be drawn therefrom that
vould support a judgment in favor of the
Dsing party the directed verdict cannot be
ustained. Management Committee v.
Waystone Pines, Utah, 652 P.2d 896
1982).
The judgment on the special verdict is
acated and the case remanded for a new
ial. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

OAKS, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the Court's opinion, but believe that instead of reserving judgment on
the effect of plaintiff's "failure to mitigate
damages," this Court should give guidance
on how the district court should handle the
issue of apportionment of damages on the
new trial.
Our comparative negligence statute,
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37, only applies to
negligence "resulting in death or in injury
to person or property
" The "resulting
. . . injury" referred to in this section is the
accident, in this case, the fire. - Consequently, as the main opinion holds, only negligence that caused the fire is properly compared under the statute.
Negligence that only contributed to the
harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of the accident is also relevant and
should be given effect before money damages are finally apportioned. Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 465 comment c (1965).
In the context of our comparative negligence statute, this requires a two-step process, as follows:
First, the negligence of plaintiff and defendant that resulted in the accident are
compared, in the manner and with the effect specified in § 78-27-37. That is, the
trier of fact determines the amount of damages the plaintiff would be allowed to recover (independent of damages caused by
his failure to mitigate or avoid damages;,
and that amount is then "diminished in the
proportion to the amount of negligence^ [ih
causing the accident] attributable to |the
[plaintiff]." This step exhausts the effect
of the comparative negligence statute.
Second, the amount of damages (the
plaintiff would be allowed to recover untiethe first step is subjected to a further
reduction dictated by the common-law rfth
of mitigation of damages or what the fc(statement calls "the damages rule as to
avoidable consequences
" RestaU •
ment (Second) of Torts, § 465 commenj
(1965). This reduction, on which the <jKfendant has the burden of proof, applr-
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where the plaintiff is found to have been
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid
damages and where this negligence is
found to have increased his total damages
beyond what he would have suffered if he
had not been negligent in this manner.
The reduction under this step is the percentage of the total damages that is attributable to plaintiffs negligence in failing to mitigate or avoid damages.
The two-step process specified here is the
one described and applied by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Halvorson v.
Voeller, N.D., 336 N.W.2d 118 (1983), a
well-reasoned opinion to which reference is
made for further discussion. The process
is illustrated in that court's example, quoted in the footnote.1
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KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff brought this action to recover
for injuries sustained while a guest passenger in a jeep operated by defendant that
rolled over while attempting an off-road
hill climb.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant in reliance upon
the Guest Statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-9-1.
Plaintiff appeals, and defendant cross-appeals the court's denial of his motion to
dismiss a second cause of action based on
intoxication and willful misconduct.
Malxxn v. -Lewis,- Utah,-693-P.2d-661
(1984), determines the Guest Statute to be
unconstitutional. We therefore vacate the
judgment of the trial court and remand this
case for trial. No costs awarded.
STEWART, HOWE, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Douglas BOTTOMS, Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,
Scott O. HUNSAKER, Defendant,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
No. 17775.
Supreme Court of Utah.

Melissa BUNKER, By and Through her
general guardian, Karen MECHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

May 1, 1984.

v.
Ted MOHLMAN, Defendant-Respondent.

Appeal from Third District Court, Salt
Lake County; James S. Sawaya, Judge.

No. 17286.

John L. Black, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff, appellant and cross-respondent.
Roger H. Bullock, Salt Lake City, for
defendant, respondent and cross-appellant.
1.

Assume: X driving a car, and Y, driving a
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent
liable for causing the accident [the "injury"
under § 78-27-37], making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent liable for causing the accident. The jury also finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his injuries [damages] if he
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable for
causing Y's [damages]. Y proves $100,000 in
damages.

Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.
Appeal from Fourth District Court, Utah
County; David Sam, Judge.
On the basis of these findings, the $100,000
award should be reduced by 40 percent,
which accounts for Y's contributing to the
cause of the accident. Hence, the award is
diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the
extent that Y's [damages] would have been
[avoided] had he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves a total award of
$24,000.
Id. at 121-22 n. 2.

